The Tao of Karadoxy

To explain the title of this article, I have to explain what I mean by Karadoxy. It is a hybrid word, perhaps even an oxymoron, or perhaps not. It refers to a hybrid form of Karaism and rabbinic Orthodoxy, or at least a way of reconciling the differences in some areas. This paradox, and concurrent solution, I call the “Tao”.

Let me explain this by citing a rabbinic law written by Rabbanism's greatest individual, Maimonides.

In his Laws of Rebels or Mamrim, he writes:

Ch1: Halacha 5

The following rules apply when there are two sages or two courts that have differing opinions in an age when there was no Supreme Sanhedrin or during the time when the Supreme Sanhedrin was still undecided concerning the matter - whether in one age or in two different ages - one rules that an article is pure and one rules that it is impure, one forbids an article's use and one permits it. If one does not know in which direction the law tends, should the matter involve a question of Scriptural Law, follow the more severe opinion. If it involve a question of Rabbinic Law, follow the more lenient opinion.

Source: http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/1181852/jewish/Mamrim-Chapter-1.htm

accessed today :)

He speaks of a difference of opinion between sages or courts, outside of the scope of the Sanhedrin. That poses a problem, but we know that the Sanhedrin was not always purely rabbinic, and sometimes it was not existent at all. Suffice to say, there were always times when a dispute existed, whether within the rabbinic structure or with it.

In a case of doubt, the individual is allowed to differentiate between Torah law and Rabbinic law.

As far as torah law goes, he should go with the stricter opinion. However, the dispute might not always be about strictness per se. For example, counting the Omer is a dispute between the 2 sides, which is not about one opinion being harder to keep than the other (except for the fact that counting the rabbinic way is illogical and hence harder to reconcile). It could also be said that keeping in line with the strict interpretation of the Torah is also “stricter”. However, what is very interesting is the second part of this statement, is the question of rabbinic law. If there is a doubt regarding rabbinic law, one is entitled to be lenient , ie to ignore the rabbinic law.

This provides, in fact a double whammy for Karaites. Firstly, there is always doubt as to the status of rabbinic law, since we know that the Prophets and Priests opposed rabbinic law, and adding to the Torah. Second, the very act of adding to the Torah is something to be taken strictly. Since the strict interpretation of this law excludes any extra-scriptural laws, then by choosing to be strict on the Torah law, we can refuse to accept any rabbinic law.

Whilst this won't persuade the rabbis, the logic at least works. They do not recognize the authority of anyone else, but we are not forced to recognize their either.

Maimonides, Shabbat, and the Karaites – a Persuasive Critique

An interesting argument is brought by Maimonides in his Hilchot Shabbat, which he uses as an interesting critique of his Karaite rivals.

The question is concerning the suspension of Shabbat laws in the case of a danger to life or illness.

The Rabbis generally give dispensation to violate the regular shabbat laws to save a life or even to reduce the risk of death. Apparently this was frowned upon by Karaites of the time.

We see in Hilchot Shabbat ch 2:

Halacha 1

The [laws of] the Sabbath are suspended1 in the face of a danger to life,2 as are [the obligations of] the other mitzvot. Therefore, we may perform - according to the directives of a professional physician3 of that locale4 - everything that is necessary for the benefit of a sick person whose life is in danger.

When there is a doubt whether or not the Sabbath laws must be violated on a person's behalf, one should violate the Sabbath laws on his behalf, for the Sabbath laws are suspended even when there is merely a question of danger to a person's life. [The same principles apply] when one physician says the Sabbath laws should be violated on a person's behalf and another physician states that this is not necessary.5

Halacha 2

[The following laws apply when physicians] determine on the Sabbath that a person needs [a treatment to be administered] for eight days. We do not say that we should wait until the evening so that it will not be necessary to violate two Sabbaths on his behalf.6 Instead, the treatment is begun immediately, on the Sabbath, and even one hundred Sabbaths may be violated on his behalf.

As long as a person is dangerously [ill] - or even if there is a question whether or not he is dangerously [ill] - and requires treatment, [the Sabbath] should be violated [on his behalf]. A lamp may be lit on his behalf and extinguished on his behalf.7 [Animals] may be slaughtered on his behalf, [food] baked and cooked on his behalf, and water heated for him, whether to drink or to use for bathing.

The general principle for a person who is dangerously ill is that the Sabbath should be considered as a weekday regarding all his needs.8

Halacha 3

When such treatment is administered, it should not be administered by gentiles,9 by children,10 by servants, or by women,11 so that they will not view the Sabbath flippantly.12 Instead, the treatment should be administered by the leaders of Israel13 and the wise.

It is forbidden to hesitate before transgressing the Sabbath [laws] on behalf of a person who is dangerously ill,14 as [reflected in the interpretation in the phrase of Leviticus 18:5,] "which a person shall perform to live through them," as "['to live through them'] and not to die through them."

This teaches that the judgments of the Torah do not [bring] vengeance to the world, but rather bring mercy, kindness, and peace to the world. Concerning those non-believers who say that [administering such treatment] constitutes a violation of the Sabbath and is forbidden,15 one may apply the verse [Ezekiel 20:25]: "[As punishment,] I gave them harmful laws and judgments through which they cannot live."16

Source: http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/935201/jewish/Shabbos-Chapter-Two.htm#footnote16a935201

The argument is that saving a life overrides the observance of strict Shabbat rules, and that one is fulfilling a mitzvah in violating the Sabbath by saving a life. His critique of the Karaites is that they did not allow such a dispensation. Whether this is factually correct or not, is a matter of historical research. The implication is that without the “oral law”, we would be unable to determine whether we can override shabbat in such cases. This is an interesting and somewhat persuasive argument. However, through historical and textual research, we can find evidence that would blunt Rambam's claim.

Firstly, throughout the TNK, we see that Israel was engaged in warfare with our brutal enemies. This includes even Moses, who would lead us in war. The siege of Jericho was at least 7 days long. Thus warfare was carried out on Shabbat, whether it is mentioned explicitly or not. This is not something that we need to refer to oral law to verify. Furthermore, the first book of Maccabees shows that the Maccabee priests, who were opposed by the Pharisees, also faced such a dilemma. When they refrained form fighting on shabbat, they were killed, and hence decided to violate the Shabbat in order to defend themselves. The Maccabees were not known to be adherents of oral law. Had they been, then such experimentation would not have been necessary, since they would have already received the tradition.

Thus, what Maimonides states about Shabbat is certainly humane, and can be derived from the texts, without resorting to oral law. It may also be true the historic Karaites were very strict on such matters. But this in itself is not a proof or disproof of oral law vs. TNK only. Rather it shows lack of imagination of some Karaite scholars during a certain period.